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Abstract—This work considers the secure and reliable infor-
mation transmission in two-hop relay wireless networks without
the information of both eavesdropper channels and locations.
While the previous work on this problem mainly studied infinite
networks and their asymptotic behavior and scaling law results,
this papers focuses on a more practical network with finite
number of system nodes and explores the corresponding exact
results on the number of eavesdroppers the network can tolerant
to ensure a desired secrecy and reliability. For achieving secure
and reliable information transmission in a finite network, two
transmission protocols are considered in this paper, one adopts
an optimal but complex relay selection process with less load
balance capacity while the other adopts a random but simple
relay selection process with good load balance capacity. Theo-
retical analysis is further provided to determine the exact and
maximum number of independent and also uniformly distributed
eavesdroppers one network can tolerate to satisfy a specified
requirement in terms of the maximum secrecy outage probability
and maximum transmission outage probability allowed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Two-hop ad hoc wireless networks, where each packet
travels at most two hops (source-relay-destination) to reach its
destination, has been a class of basic and important networking
scenarios [1]. Actually, the analysis of basic two-hop relay
networks serves as the foundation for performance study of
general multi-hop networks. Due to the promising applications
of ad hoc wireless networks in many important scenarios (like
battlefield networks, emergency networks, disaster recovery
networks), the consideration of secrecy (and also reliability)
in such networks is of great importance for ensuring the
high confidentiality requirements of these applications. This
paper focuses on the issue of secure and reliable information
transmission in the basic two-hop ad hoc wireless networks.
Traditionally, the information security is provided by adopt-
ing the cryptography approach, where a plain message is
encrypted through a cryptographic algorithm that is hard to
break (decrypt) in practice by any adversary without the
key. While the cryptography is acceptable for general ap-
plications with standard security requirement, it may not be
sufficient for applications with a requirement of strong form
of security (like military networks and emergency networks).
This is because that the cryptographic approach can hardly
achieve everlasting secrecy, since the adversary can record
the transmitted messages and try any way to break them
[2]. That is why there is an increasing interest in applying
signaling scheme in physical layer to provide a strong form
of security, where a degraded signal at an eavesdropper is
always ensured such that the original data can be hardly
recovered regardless of how the signal is processed at the
eavesdropper. We consider applying physical layer method to
guarantee secure and reliable information transmission in the
two-hop wireless networks.
By now, a lot of research efforts have been dedicated
to providing security through physical layer methods. A
power control scheme is proposed in [3] to ensure that
an eavesdropper can never reach its desired signal-to-noise-
plus-interference ratio (SINR). However, such scheme is not
effective when the eavesdropper has a better channel than the
receiver. The technique of artificial noise generation has also
been widely explored to jam the eavesdroppers and provide
secure transmission in the relay communications [4][5][6][7].
Recently, the cooperative jamming through node cooperation
has been demonstrated to be efficient in ensuring physical
layer security [8][9][10]. It is notable that these schemes
generally reply on the knowledge of eavesdropper channels
and locations to jam eavesdroppers. In practice, however, it
is difficult to gain such information, specifically in untrusted
network environment. To address this constraint, a cooperative
protocol based on artificial noise generation and multi-user
diversity has been proposed recently in [11] to achieve secure
transmission in two-hop wireless networks without the knowl-
edge of eavesdropper channels and locations. In particular,
the asymptotic behavior of such cooperative protocol in a
network has been reported there to illustrate how the number
of eavesdroppers the network can tolerate scales as the number
of system nodes there tends to infinite.
This paper focuses on applying the relay cooperation
scheme to achieve secure and reliable information transmission
in a more practical finite two-hop wireless network without the
knowledge of both eavesdropper channels and locations. The
main contributions of this paper as follows:
1) For achieving secure and reliable information
transmission in a more practical two-hop wireless network
with finite number of system nodes, we consider the
application of the cooperative protocol proposed in [11] with
an optimal and complex relay selection process but less load
balance capacity, and also propose to use a new cooperative
protocol with a simple and random relay selection process
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Fig. 1. System scenario: Source S wishes to communicate securely with
destination D with the assistance of finite relays R1, R2, · · · , Rn (n=4 in
the figure) in the presence of passive eavesdroppers E1, E2, · · · , Em (m=4
in the figure). Cooperative relay scheme is used in the two-hop transmission.
A assistant node is selected randomly as relay (R1 in the figure).
but good load balance capacity.
2) Rather than exploring the asymptotic behavior and scal-
ing law results, this paper provides theoretic analysis of above
both cooperative protocols to determine the corresponding
exact results on the number of independent and also uniformly
distributed eavesdroppers one network can tolerate to satisfy a
specified requirement in terms of the maximum secrecy outage
probability and maximum transmission outage probability
allowed.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II introduces the system models and two cooperative
transmission protocols considered in this paper. Section III
provides theoretical analysis and also related discussions of
the two protocols, and Section IV concludes this paper.
II. SYSTEM MODELS AND TRANSMISSION PROTOCOLS
A. Network Model
As illustrated in Fig.1 that we consider a network scenario
where a source node S wishes to communicate securely
with its destination node D with the help of multiple relay
nodes R1, R2, · · · , Rn. In addition to these normal system
nodes, there are also m eavesdroppers E1, E2, · · · , Em
that are independent and also uniformly distributed in the
network. Our goal here is to ensure the secure and reliable
information transmission from source S to destination D under
the condition that no real time information is available about
both eavesdropper channels and locations.
B. Transmission Model
Consider the transmission from a transmitter A to a receiver
B, and denote by x(A)i the ith symbol transmitted by A and
denote by y(B)i the ith signal received by B. We assume that
all nodes transmit with the same power Es, path loss between
all pairs of nodes is equal and independent, and the frequency-
nonselective multi-path fading from A to B is a complex zero-
mean Gaussian random variable. Under the condition that all
nodes in a group of nodes, R, are generating noises, the ith
signal received at node B from node A is determined as:
y
(B)
i = hA,B
√
Esx
(A)
i +
∑
Ai∈R
hAi,B
√
Esx
(Ai)
i + n
(B)
i ,
where the noise
{
n
(B)
i
}
at receiver B is assumed to be
i.i.d complex Gaussian random variables with E
[∣∣∣n(B)i ∣∣∣2
]
=
N0, and |hA,B|2 is exponentially distributed with mean
E
[
|hA,B|2
]
. Without loss of generality, we assume that
E
[
|hA,B|2
]
= 1. The SINR CA,B from A to B is then given
by
CA,B =
Es |hA,B|2∑
Ai∈REs|hAi,B|
2
+N0/2
For a legitimate node and an eavesdropper, we use two sepa-
rate SINR thresholds γR and γE to define the minimum SINR
required to recover the transmitted messages for legitimate
node and eavesdropper, respectively. Therefore, a system node
(relay or destination) is able to decode a packet if and only
if its SINR is greater than γR, while the transmitted message
is secure if and only if the SINR at each eavesdropper is less
than γE .
C. Transmission Protocols
We consider here two transmission protocols for secure
and reliable information transmission in two-hop wireless
networks. The first protocol (hereafter called Protocol 1) is the
one proposed in [11], in which the optimal relay node with the
best link condition to both source and destination is always
selected for information relaying. Although this protocol is
attractive in the sense that it provide very effective resistance
against eavesdroppers, it suffers from several problems. The
protocol 1 involves a complicated process of optimal relay
selection, which is not very suitable for the distributed wireless
networks, in particular when the number of possible relay
nodes is huge. More importantly, since the channel state is
relatively constant during a fixed time period, some relay
nodes with good link conditions are always preferred for
information relaying, resulting a severe load balance problem
and a quick node energy depletion in energy-limited wireless
environment.
Based on these observations, we propose to use a simple
and random relay selection rather than the optimal relay
selection to achieve a better load and energy consumption
balance among possible relay nodes. By modifying the Proto-
col 1 to include the random relay selection process, the new
transmission protocol (hereafter called Protocol 2) works as
follows.
1) Relay selection: A relay node, indexed by j∗, is selected
randomly from candidate relay nodes Rj , j = 1, 2, · · · , n.
2) Channel measurement between the selected relay and
the other relays: The selected relay j∗ broadcasts a pilot signal
to allow each of other relays to measure the channel from j∗
to itself. Each of the other relays Rj , j = 1, 2, · · · , n, j 6= j∗
then knows the corresponding value of hRj ,Rj∗ .
3) Channel measurement between destination D and the
other relays: The destination D broadcasts a pilot signal to
allow each of other relays to measure the channel from D to
itself. Each of the other relays Rj , j = 1, 2, · · · , n, j 6= j∗
then knows the corresponding value of hRj ,D.
4) Message transmission from source S to the se-
lected relay Rj∗ : The source S transmits the messages to
Rj∗ . Concurrently, the relay nodes with indexes in R1 ={
j 6= j∗ : |hRj ,Rj∗ |2 < τ
}
, transmit noise to generate suffi-
cient interference at eavesdroppers.
5) Message transmission from the selected relay Rj∗ to
destination D: Similar to the Step 4, the relay Rj∗ transmits
the messages to destination D. Concurrently, the relay nodes
with indexes in R2 =
{
j 6= j∗ : |hRj ,D|2 < τ
}
, transmit noise
to generate sufficient interference at eavesdroppers.
III. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
This section first defines the transmission outage and se-
crecy outage adopted in this paper to depict transmission
reliability and transmission secrecy, and then provides theo-
retical analysis to determine the numbers of eavesdroppers a
network can tolerate based on the Protocol 1 and Protocol 2,
respectively.
A. Transmission Outage and Secrecy Outage
For a transmission from the source S to destination D,
we call transmission outage happens if D can not decode
the transmitted packet, i.e., D received the packet with SINR
less than the predefined threshold γR. The transmission outage
probability, denoted as P (T )out , is then defined as the probability
that transmission outage from S to D happens. For a prede-
fined upper bound εt on P (T )out , we call the communication
between S and D is reliable if P (T )out ≤ εt. Notice that for the
transmissions from S to the selected relay Rj∗ and from Rj∗
to D, the corresponding transmission outage can be defined in
the similar way as that of from S to D. We use O(T )S→Rj∗ and
O
(T )
Rj∗→D to denote the events that transmission outage from
source S to Rj∗ happens and transmission outage from relay
Rj∗ to D happens, respectively. Due to the link independence
assumption, we have
P
(T )
out = P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗ ∪O
(T )
Rj∗→D
)
= P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗
)
+ P
(
O
(T )
Rj∗→D
)
− P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗
)
· P
(
O
(T )
Rj∗→D
)
Regarding the secrecy outage, we call secrecy outage hap-
pens for a transmission from S to D if at least one eaves-
dropper can recover the transmitted packets during the process
of this two-hop transmission, i.e., at least one eavesdropper
received the packet with SINR larger than the predefined
threshold γE . The secrecy outage probability, denoted as P (S)out ,
is then defined as the probability that secrecy outage happens
during the transmission from S to D. For a predefined upper
bound εs on P (S)out , we call the communication between S and
D is secure if P (S)out ≤ εs. Notice that for the transmissions
from S to the selected relay Rj∗ and from Rj∗ to D, the
corresponding secrecy outage can be defined in the similar
way as that of from S to D. We use O(S)S→Rj∗ and O
(S)
Rj∗→D
to denote the events that secrecy outage from source S to Rj∗
happens and secrecy outage from relay Rj∗ to D happens,
respectively. Again, due to the link independence assumption,
we have
P
(S)
out = P
(
O
(S)
S→Rj∗
)
+ P
(
O
(S)
Rj∗→D
)
− P
(
O
(S)
S→Rj∗
)
· P
(
O
(S)
Rj∗→D
)
B. Analysis of Protocol 1
In the Protocol 1 proposed in [11], the relay node with the
largest value of min
(∣∣hS,Rj ∣∣2 , ∣∣hD,Rj ∣∣2) , j = 1, 2, · · · , n, is
selected as relay. Notice that the Protocol 1 can always guar-
antee the reliable transmission from source S to destination
D, this is because the parameter τ is set as τ =
√
logn
8nγR
,
which ensures that the target SINR at the selected relay
and destination can be achieved to decode the transmitted
messages. Thus, we only need to focus the secrecy requirement
P
(S)
out ≤ εs to determine the corresponding the number of
eavesdroppers the network can tolerate here.
Theorem 1. For the network scenario illustrated in Fig 1
with equal path loss between all pairs of nodes, to guarantee
the secrecy requirement P (S)out ≤ εs by applying the Protocol
1, the number of eavesdroppers m the network can tolerate
should satisfy the following condition.
m ≤ (1−√1− εs) · (1 + γE)√n logn32γR
Proof:
Notice that P (S)out is determined as
P
(S)
out = P
(
O
(S)
S→Rj∗
)
+ P
(
O
(S)
Rj∗→D
)
− P
(
O
(S)
S→Rj∗
)
· P
(
O
(S)
Rj∗→D
)
Since the transmission process from source S to the selected
relay Rj∗ is identical to that of from the selected relay Rj∗
to destination D, we have
P
(
O
(S)
S→Rj∗
)
= P
(
O
(S)
Rj∗→D
)
and
P
(S)
out = 2P
(
O
(S)
S→Rj∗
)
−
[
P
(
O
(S)
S→Rj∗
)]2
To ensure P (S)out ≤ εs, then should have
P
(
O
(S)
S→Rj∗
)
≤ 1−√1− εs
From the reference [11], we notice that
P
(
O
(S)
S→Rj∗
)
= P
(
m⋃
i=1
{CS,Ei ≥ γE}
)
≤
m∑
i=1
P (CS,Ei ≥ γE)
≤ m ·
(
1
1 + γE
)√n logn
32γR
To guarantee the secrecy requirement, we just need
m ·
(
1
1 + γE
)√n logn
32γR ≤ 1−√1− εs
and thus
m ≤ (1−√1− εs) · (1 + γE)√n logn32γR
C. Analysis of Protocol 2
The parameter τ involved in the Protocol 2 determines
whether the relay and destination can receive the messages
successfully and whether sufficient noise is generated to sup-
press eavesdroppers. For the analysis of the Protocol 2, we first
determine the range for the parameter τ to ensure both secrecy
requirement and reliability requirement, based on which we
then analyze the number of eavesdroppers a network can be
tolerate by applying the protocol.
Theorem 2. Consider the network scenario of Fig 1 with
equal path loss between all pairs of nodes, to ensure P (T )out ≤ εt
and P (S)out ≤ εs by applying the Protocol 2, the parameter τ
must satisfy the following condition.
τ ∈

− log

1 + log
(
1−√1−εs
m
)
(n− 1) log (1 + γE)

,
√
− log (1− εt)
2γR (n− 1)


Proof:
Notice that in the Protocol 2, a larger value of τ indicates
that more system nodes will generate noise to suppress the
eavesdroppers. However, too high noise will also interrupt the
legitimate transmission. Therefore, the parameter τ should be
set properly to satisfy both reliability and secrecy require-
ments.
• Reliability Guarantee
Notice that P (T )out is determined as
P
(T )
out = P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗
)
+ P
(
O
(T )
Rj∗→D
)
− P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗
)
· P
(
O
(T )
Rj∗→D
)
Because the transmission process from source S to the
selected relay Rj∗ is identical to that of from the selected
relay Rj∗ to destination D, we have
P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗
)
= P
(
O
(T )
Rj∗→D
)
and
P
(T )
out = 2P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗
)
−
[
P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗
)]2
To ensure P (T )out ≤ εt, we need
P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗
)
≤ 1−√1− εt
Based on the definition of transmission outage probability,
we have
P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗
)
= P
(
CS,Rj∗ ≤ γR
)
= P
(
Es · |hS,Rj∗ |2∑
Rj∈R1 Es · |hRj ,Rj∗ |2 +N0/2
≤ γR
)
.
= P
(
|hS,Rj∗ |2∑
Rj∈R1 |hRj ,Rj∗ |2
≤ γR
)
Compared to the noise generated by multiple system
nodes, the environment noise is negligible and thus is
omitted here to simply the analysis. Notice that R1 ={
j 6= j∗ : |hRj ,Rj∗ |2 < τ
}
, then
P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗
)
≤ P
(
|hS,Rj∗ |2
|R1|τ ≤ γR
)
= P
(|hS,Rj∗ |2 ≤ γR|R1|τ)
= 1− e−γR|R1|τ
Since there are n− 1 other relays except Rj∗ , the expected
number of noise-generation nodes is given by |R1| = (n− 1)·
P
(|hRj ,Rj∗ |2 < τ) = (n− 1) · (1− e−τ ). Then we have
P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗
)
≤ 1− e−γR(n−1)(1−e−τ )τ
Thus, to ensure reliability requirement, we just need
1− e−γR(n−1)(1−e−τ)τ ≤ 1−√1− εt
That is,
−γR (n− 1)
(
1− e−τ) τ ≥ 1
2
log (1− εt)
By using Taylor formula, we have
τ2 ≤ − log (1− εt)
2γR (n− 1)
and thus
τ ≤
√
− log (1− εt)
2γR (n− 1)
The above result indicates that
√
− log(1−εt)
2γR(n−1) is the maxi-
mum value the parameter τ can take to ensure the reliability
requirement.
• Secrecy Guarantee
Notice that P (S)out is given by
P
(S)
out = P
(
O
(S)
S→Rj∗
)
+ P
(
O
(S)
Rj∗→D
)
− P
(
O
(S)
S→Rj∗
)
· P
(
O
(S)
Rj∗→D
)
Since the transmission process from source S to the selected
relay Rj∗ is identical to that of from the selected relay Rj∗
to destination D, then we have
P
(
O
(S)
S→Rj∗
)
= P
(
O
(S)
Rj∗→D
)
and
P
(S)
out = 2P
(
O
(S)
S→Rj∗
)
−
[
P
(
O
(S)
S→Rj∗
)]2
To ensure P (S)out ≤ εs, we need
P
(
O
(S)
S→Rj∗
)
≤ 1−√1− εs
According to the definition of secrecy outage probability,
we know that
P
(
O
(S)
S→Rj∗
)
= P
(
m⋃
i=1
{CS,Ei ≥ γE}
)
Thus, we have
P
(
O
(S)
S→Rj∗
)
≤
m∑
i=1
P (CS,Ei ≥ γE)
Based on the Markov inequality,
P (CS,Ei ≥ γE)
≤ P
(
Es · |hS,Ei|2∑
Rj∈R1 Es · |hRj ,Ei |2
≥ γE
)
= E{hRj,Ei ,j=0,1,··· ,n+mp,j 6=j∗},R1
P

|hS,Ei|2 > γE · ∑
Rj∈R1
|hRj ,Ei |2




≤ ER1

 ∏
Rj∈R1
EhRj,Ei
[
e−γE |hRj,Ei |
2
]
= ER1
[(
1
1 + γE
)|R1|]
Therefore,
P
(
O
(S)
S→Rj∗
)
≤
m∑
i=1
(
1
1 + γE
)|R1|
= m ·
(
1
1 + γE
)|R1|
To ensure the secrecy requirement, we just need
m ·
(
1
1 + γE
)|R1|
≤ 1−√1− εs
or equally
(
1
1 + γE
)(n−1)(1−e−τ )
≤ 1−
√
1− εs
m
(n− 1) (1− e−τ) ≥ − log
(
1−√1−εs
m
)
log (1 + γE)
e−τ ≤ 1 +
log
(
1−√1−εs
m
)
(n− 1) log (1 + γE)
Then we have
τ ≥ − log

1 + log
(
1−√1−εs
m
)
(n− 1) log (1 + γE)


The above result shows that − log
[
1 +
log
(
1−
√
1−εs
m
)
(n−1) log (1+γE)
]
is
the minimum value parameter τ can take to guarantee the
secrecy requirement.
Based on the results of Theorem 2, we now can establish
the following theorem about the performance of Protocol 2.
Theorem 3. Consider the network scenario of Fig 1 with
equal path loss between all pairs of nodes. To guarantee
P
(T )
out ≤ εt and P (S)out ≤ εs based on the Protocol 2, the number
of eavesdroppers m the network can tolerate must satisfy the
following condition.
m ≤ (1−√1− εs) · (1 + γE)√−(n−1) log(1−εt)2γR
Proof:
From Theorem 2 we know that to ensure the reliability
requirement, we have
τ ≤
√
− log (1− εt)
2γR (n− 1)
and
(n− 1) (1− e−τ) ≤ − log (1− εt)
2γRτ
To ensure the secrecy requirement, we need
(
1
1 + γE
)(n−1)(1−e−τ )
≤ 1−
√
1− εs
m
Thus,
m ≤ 1−
√
1− εs(
1
1+γE
)(n−1)(1−e−τ )
≤ 1−
√
1− εs(
1
1+γE
)− log(1−εt)
2γRτ
By let τ taking its maximum value, we get the following
bound
m ≤ 1−
√
1− εs(
1
1+γE
)√−(n−1) log(1−εt)
2γR
That is,
m ≤ (1−√1− εs) · (1 + γE)√−(n−1) log(1−εt)2γR
D. Discussion
The two protocols considered in this paper have their own
advantages and disadvantages and thus are suitable for differ-
ent network scenarios. For the protocol 1 proposed in [11], it
can achieve a better performance in terms of the number of
eavesdroppers can be tolerated. However, such protocol always
tend to select the optimal node with the best links to both
source and destination as the relay, so it involves a complex
relay selection process, and more importantly, it results in an
unbalanced load and energy consumption distribution among
systems nodes. Thus, such protocol is suitable for small
scale wireless network with sufficient energy supply rather
than large and energy-limited wireless networks (like wireless
sensor networks). Regarding the Protocol 2, although it can
tolerate less number eavesdroppers in comparison with the
Protocol 1, it involves a very simple random relay selection
process to achieve a very good load and energy consumption
distribution among system nodes. Thus, this protocol is more
suitable for large scale wireless network environment with
stringent energy consumption constraint.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper explores reliable and secure information
transmission through multiple cooperative systems nodes in
two-hop relay wireless network with passive eavesdroppers of
unknown channels and locations, for which two transmission
protocols are considered. For each protocol, theoretical anal-
ysis has been provided to show the number of eavesdroppers
the network can tolerate subject to constraints on transmission
outage probability and secrecy outage probability. These two
protocols, each has different performance in terms of eaves-
dropper tolerance, load and energy consumption distribution
among nodes, and also relay selection complexity, are suitable
for different network scenarios depending on network scale
and also energy consumption constraint there.
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